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INTRODUCTION

This article deals with the working-level dispute-settlement apparatus of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").' In particular, it discusses
*

C.V. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School; Of Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb,

Steen & Hamilton.
1. Following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the WTO was created as from
January 1, 1995 by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) and the agreements annexed thereto and incorporated
therein, three of which are particularly relevant to this article: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 1.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
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the work of the Appellate Body and, functioning below it, panels established by the WTO to conduct proceedings in individual cases.2 It

focuses on the relationship between the Appellate Body and panels, and
on the responsibilities of the Appellate Body in the context of that relationship.
This article's principal point of departure in examining that relationship is the WTO case known as the Asbestos case, in which a WTO panel
issued a report in November 2000,' and the Appellate Body issued a report in March 2001 . The case attracted considerable attention because it
took place against a background of criticism by some commentators of
the way in which the WTO has balanced the policy of fostering multilateral trade against non-trade policies involving, for example, the
environment, health, and the treatment of workers These policy issues
are not the main focus of this article, however, in part because it concentrates on the relationship between the Appellate Body and WTO panels
as such, and in part because, in any event, the mandate and resources of
the WTO limit its authority outside the area of multilateral trade.
A brief introductory summary seems in order concerning the Appellate Body and WTO panels. Under the old GATT,6 the predecessor to the
WTO, dispute settlement was handled by panels, and their creation and
reports were subject to confirmation by all of the GATT member counROUND Vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding

or DSU]. As of Jan. 1, 2002, the WTO had 144 members, and some 30 additional countries
were seeking membership.
2. See DSU. See also GABRIELLE MARCEAU & PETER MORRISON, WORLD TRADE ORWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: A COLLECTION OF LEGAL
TExTs, WTO/OMC/1995-03 (1995); DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999);
GANIZATION, THE

James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001). Panels are appointed pursuant to Articles 6
and 8 of the DSU. The Appellate Body has seven members appointed by the members of the
WTO acting for the Dispute Settlement Body pursuant to Article 17.
3. Rapport du Groupe sp6cial, Communaut6s Europ6ennes-mesures affectant
l'amiante et les produits en contenant, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Asbestos Panel report].
4. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Appellate Body Asbestos report]. The seven-member Appellate Body acted in this
case through a three-member Division composed of Messrs. Feliciano, Bacchus, and Ehlermann (the "AB Division").
5. See, e.g., the commentaries collected in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001); Jenny Bates & Greg Principato,
Progressive Policy Institute, A Third Way on Trade and Globalization (July 18, 2000), at
http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=1499; Steve Charnovitz, Progressive Policy Institute, Addressing Environmental and Labor Issues in the World Trade Organization
(Nov. 1, 1999), at http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=649.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I I, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
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tries, with the result that on occasion panel proceedings were blocked or
panel reports failed to come into effect] When the WTO came into being
in 1995, the old GATT procedures were changed in several significant
ways, of which two will be mentioned.
First, the Appellate Body was added, and countries that bring disputes before WTO panels have been given the right to appeal to the
Appellate Body on issues of law or legal interpretations covered by or
expressed in panel reports. Although the relevant written procedures
seem to assume that WTO dispute settlement will be primarily the work
of panels, with occasional resort to the Appellate Body on points of law,
in practice the Appellate Body has become deeply involved in the handling of many disputes, and in a number of instances has issued reports
that "complete the analysis" of, or otherwise rework in some detail, reports issued by panels.8
Second, there is no effective appeal from a report issued by the Appellate Body. It has no power of remand, and thus it cannot rule on a
point of law in a case and then send the case back to a panel for further
proceedings. More importantly, a report by the Appellate Body automatically comes into effect unless it is rejected by a unanimous vote of
the WTO member-countries (sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body). 9
Since at least the country benefiting from an Appellate Body report can
be expected to vote in favor of the report, the practical result is that every
report by the Appellate Body automatically comes into effect and is not
subject to further review.
The Appellate Body is thus vested with considerable power, especially in the context of its relationship with individual panels whose
reports it receives on appeal. If, in the opinion of the Appellate Body, a
panel has committed error on a point of law in a particular case, the case

7. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 1-18.
8. Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the DSU, the member countries of the WTO "affirm their
adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied" under GA'T
1947, which refers in large part to the use of panels before the creation of the Appellate Body
in the WTO. Eleven articles of the DSU (Articles 6 through 16) and a 12-section appendix
thereto (Appendix 3) are devoted to panels. One article (Article 17) is devoted to the Appellate
Body. The next two articles (Articles 18 and 19) are common to communications with and
recommendations by both panels and the Appellate Body. On the development of the technique whereby the Appellate Body "completes the analysis" of a panel, see Sydney M. Cone
Il, The Appellate Body, the Protection of Sea Turtles, and the Technique of "Completing the
Analysis," J. WORLD TRADE, April 1999, at 51, 56-61 (1999) [hereinafter Completing the
Analysis). See also Cone, The Appellate Body and Harrowsmith Country Life, J. WORLD
TRADE, April 1998, at 103, 113-15 [hereinafter Harrowsmith].
9. DSU Art. 2.4, 20. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 61-62, 153-60;
Completing the Analysis, supra note 8, at 59. Between the establishment of the WTO in 1995
and September 2001, over 225 complaints were filed with the WTO, and over 50 reports by
panels or the Appellate Body were adopted pursuant to the DSU.
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will not go back to the panel for further proceedings. If the Appellate
Body rejects a panel's analysis of facts and law and proceeds to "complete the analysis" in a different manner from that employed by the
panel, the analysis thus completed is not, as a practical matter, subject to
review by anyone, and there is no opportunity for a further weighing of
the work of the panel as against that of the Appellate Body. This means
that, in any given case, the Appellate Body, as a practical matter, has ultimate and definitive authority to determine the proper scope and content
of changes to, or rejections of, a panel's analysis carried out by the Appellate Body in order to "complete the analysis" of the panel or
otherwise to dispose of the panel's report. 1
The considerable power of the Appellate Body just described means
that it is in a position to act as the judicial suzerain of the WTO in individual cases-a position having important implications for the
jurisprudence and the judicial administration of the WTO. It is these implications which provide the focus of this article. The Appellate Body, in
the area of formulating WTO jurisprudence, develops the fundamental
framework for decisionmaking by future panels in future cases. More
generally, the Appellate Body is uniquely situated to provide administrative leadership that, properly exercised, will give coherence and
effectiveness to panels and the Appellate Body acting as the judiciary of
the WTO. It seems appropriate to consider whether, in these areas, the
relationship between the Appellate Body and panels might be the subject
of constructive reconsideration.
Reconsideration of the manner in which the Appellate Body disposes
of the work of various panels in various cases raises the following types
of questions. Are the Appellate Body and panels acting in concert in a
shared judicial endeavor? Is their relationship informed by the common
goals of handling cases efficiently, achieving judicial economy, and
minimizing disharmony in the development of WTO jurisprudence? Is
adequate attention given to the impact of individual decisions on the disposition of future cases? Where on a potential spectrum should panel
reports be located between, for example, being considered as the workproduct of clerks, to be marked up or discarded without inhibition, and
being treated as potential sources of substantive value and as integral to a
single procedural continuum?
The concerns raised by these questions seem to be illustrated in an
instructive manner by the Asbestos case. It was not a run-of-the-mill
trade case, but one that required rulings in several key areas of the law
governing multilateral trade. Because the case was being followed by
constituencies both within and outside the WTO-constituencies con10. See Completing the Analysis, supra note 8, at 60-61.
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cerned with the promotion of multilateral trade by the WTO, and constituencies concerned that competing, non-trade policy objectives do not

receive adequate attention within the WTO"-the case tested the capacity of the WTO's working-level dispute-settlement apparatus to reach

decisions in a disciplined manner having due regard for the long-term,
judicious development of WTO case law. Thus, in the context of the Asbestos case, this article will first outline the case, will next set out the
issues in the case of relevance both to the substance of the case and the
questions mentioned above, and will then proceed to analyze those is-

sues.
A. The Asbestos Case
The case was brought by Canada against the European Union (the
"EU") acting on behalf of France.' 2 Canada challenged a French decree
that came into effect in January 1997 and that, in substantial part, banned
the importation of products containing chrysotile asbestos. 3 Theretofore,
the leading exporter of those products had been Canada and, more
exactly, Qu6bec.14 Their exportation was of economic importance to
Qu6bec, and of political importance to Canada in light of relations
between French- and English-speaking Canada. 5 The prohibitions in the
French decree were grounded in the carcinogenic characteristics of

I1. Examples of non-trade-group interest in, and comments on, the Asbestos case are
found in Daniel Pruzin, WTO Delays Releasing Decision in Complaint by Canada Against
France'sBan on Asbestos, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 433 (2000); Daniel Pruzin &
Peter Menyasz, Environment: Environmental Groups Criticize WTO Ruling on Asbestos Ban,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 37, at 1432 (Sept. 21, 2000); Daniel Pruzin & Peter Menyasz,
WTO Appellate Body Upholds French Ban on Asbestos Imports, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA),
No. 11, at 426 (Mar. 15, 2001); Michael M. Weinstein, Greens and Globalization: Declaring
Defeat in the Face of Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 18; Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, on its behalf and on behalf of Ban
Asbestos (International and Virtual) Network, Greenpeace International, International Ban
Asbestos Secretariat, World Wide Fund for Nature, International, Letter and Joint Amicus
Brief in European Communities-Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Feb. 6, 2001,
available at http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/asbestosamicus.pdf; Danielle Knight, Inter
Press Service, Trade-Health: WTO Ruling Reveals Toxic Logic, Warn Groups (Sept. 19, 2000),
available at http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/septOO/16_ 19 062.html [hereinafter, collectively,
NGO Commentaries].
12. The European Communities had joined the WTO, and the European Communities (in
the singular) was the party against which Canada brought its complaint. This article uses the
more familiar contemporary appellation, European Union or EU, rather than European Communities or EC.
13. Decree No. 96-1133 of Dec. 24, 1996, J.O., Dec. 26, 1996, p. 19126; JCP 1997, 111,
68259 [hereinafter French decree].
14. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, $ 3.20.
15. See Bill Schiller, WTO Rejects Canada's Case on Asbestos, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 19,
2000, at E3.
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chrysotile asbestos.' 6 These prohibitions applied to asbestos products of
domestic and foreign origin and did not single out products originating
in Canada (or Qu6bec)."7
Among the issues raised by the case were questions concerning the
national treatment of imported products, non-tariff barriers to imported
products, the protection of public health, and technical barriers to trade.'"
The first three arose under a WTO agreement known as GATT 1994, the
fourth under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the
"TBT Agreement"). The issue of national treatment is governed by paragraph 4 of Article Ill of GATT 1994 ("Article 111:4"). The issue of nontariff barriers is governed by Article XI of GATT 1994 ("Article XI").
Public health is expressly mentioned in GATT 1994's Article XX, entitled "General Exceptions;" paragraph (b) of Article XX ("Article
XX(b)") relates to "measures" "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health."' 9
In general form, the case followed a familiar pattern in disputes
brought before panels under the old GATT and, in recent years, pursuant
to the WTO dispute-settlement procedures. Canada, the complaining
party, alleged (among other things) violations of Article 111:4, Article XI,
and the TBT Agreement. France (meaning the EU acting on behalf of
France), the defending party, responded with both denials and a justification; that is, France both offered reasoned denials of the allegations, and
additionally (as regards the alleged GATT 1994 violations) justified its
decree as falling under one of the General Exceptions as set out in Article XX(b).2"
The WTO panel that considered the Asbestos case found a violation
of Article 111:4, therefore found it unnecessary to consider Article XI,
and then proceeded to consider Article XX(b). It ruled that, notwithstanding the violation of Article 111:4, the French decree was authorized
by Article XX(b).' In other words, Canada lost, and France won on the
ground that the French decree was a measure necessary to protect human
16. Information concerning the danger to health posed by chrysotile asbestos is found in
the Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, particularly at T 5 and in the Addendum thereto,
WT/DS I 35/R/Add. 1, http://www.wto.org.
17. See French decree, supra note 13; Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, '18.224.
18. In addition to the claims under Articles 111:4 and XI (and the related arguments under
Article XX(b)) and the claim under the TBT Agreement, Canada made a claim under Article
XXIII (l)(b) of GAT 1994 to the effect that, even if the French decree did not constitute a
violation of GATT 1994, it constituted a non-violation nullification or impairment of Canada's
legitimate trade expectations. This claim was viewed as meritorious by neither the panel nor
the Appellate Body, and in the interest of brevity is not examined in this article. Asbestos
Panel report, supra note 3, 8.304; Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 191.
19. GATT 1994 Art. XX(b).
20. See Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, fl 8.3-8.
21. See id.118.144, 8.159, 8.241.
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life or health from the carcinogenic threat of chrysotile asbestos products. As for the TBT Agreement, the panel found it inapplicable in the
present case.22 On its face, then, not only did the case follow a familiar
pattern of complaint, denials, and justification found in GATT/WTO
case law, but also the panel's disposition of the case was consonant with
that familiar pattern. In disposing of the case, the panel unequivocally
permitted France to justify an exclusion of imports on grounds of public
health.
Even so, advocates of environmental and public-health policies objected to the panel's finding that the French prohibition of imports
violated Article 111:4, and to a procedure that seemingly compelled
France to justify that prohibition under Article XX(b)-a procedure, it
was claimed, that put an undue burden on the party seeking to protect
public health from a carcinogenic product.23 These reactions to the panel
report raised questions as to the interpretation of Article 111:4, and as to
the proper burden of proof allocable to parties in WTO disputes.
On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding of a violation of Article 111:4,24 thus making academic the panel's finding that the
violation was justified under Article XX(b). Nevertheless, the Appellate
Body provided its own analysis of Article XX(b), concluding (as had the
panel) that, under Article XX(b), the French prohibition on imports was
justified." It is significant that under the approach taken by the Appellate
Body, the justification was academic, because the Appellate Body had
decided that there was no Article 111:4 violation in need of justification.
Like the panel, the Appellate Body declined to rule on Canada's claim
under Article XI, 26 which meant that neither the panel nor the Appellate
Body considered whether the French decree imposed a non-tariff barrier
inconsistent with Article XI as claimed by Canada. In the case of the
Appellate Body, Canada's claim of an Article XI violation was no longer
clearly redundant, because the Appellate Body, unlike the panel, had
found that there was no violation of Article 111:4. While the Appellate
Body did not say so, its views on Article XX(b) presumably meant that,
had it been found that the French decree constituted a violation of Article
XI, the violation would have been justified on public-health grounds under Article XX(b). As for the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body
reversed the panel's finding that that Agreement was not relevant to the

22. See id. $ 8.73.
23. See NGO Commentaries, supra note 1I.
24. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 148.
155-75.
25. Id.
26. The Appellate Body report mentions Canada's Article XI claim, but does not discuss
it. Id. 113, 5.
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present case, but declined to rule one way or the other on how the TBT
Agreement should be applied to the case. 7
B. Certain Issues Raised by the Asbestos Case

In the following description, more detailed attention will be given to
the issues raised by the Asbestos case in respect of (1) Article 111:4, (2)
Article XI, (3) Article XX(b), and (4) the TBT Agreement. The following description is based on the original panel report (which, involving as
it does a dispute between Qu6bec and France, is in French), and on the
report of the Appellate Body (which is in English).
1. Article 1II:4-"Like Products"
For present purposes, the relevant provisions in Article III of GATT
1994 are paragraphs 1, 2, and 4-"Article III: I," "Article 111:2," and "Article III:4"-and a supplementary provision found in Annex I to GATT
1994 relating to Article 111:2 ("Ad Article 111:2"). Article Ill: 1,which is
said to inform all of Article III, states that internal taxes and other internal regulations "should not be applied to imported or domestic products
so as to afford protection to domestic production." 2
Article 111:2, which deals with internal taxes, has three parts. The
first sentence states that imported products shall not be subject to internal taxes in excess of those applied to "like domestic products." The
second sentence, which is drafted as an addition to the first, incorporates
Article II: 1, thereby forbidding internal taxes that "afford protection to
domestic production." Ad Article 111:2 clarifies the difference between
the first and second sentences, and states that a tax conforming to the
requirements of the first sentence is not consistent with the second sentence when there is a taxed product and "a directly competitive or
substitutable product which [is] not similarly taxed." Article 111:2's two
sentences thus contain two prohibitions. One forbids taxes on imports in
excess of taxes on "like domestic products." The other forbids taxes on
imports when "directly competitive or substitutable" domestic products
are not similarly taxed. These two sentences have been construed to
mean that "like products" constitute a narrower category than "directly
competitive or substitutable products"; that any tax differential whatever
between "like products" is suspect; but that a de minimis tax differential
would not constitute a violation of the second sentence. Put differently,
27. Id. $$ 59-83.
28. The view that this principle in Article 111:1 informs all of Article Ill is found under
"G.Article Ill: 1" in the Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8, 10, I I/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), at 17-18, http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Alcoholic
Beverages case].
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any tax discrimination between "like products" may violate the first sentence, but "like products" for this purpose is a relatively narrow concept.
On the other hand, while minimal discrimination may not violate the
second sentence, "directly competitive or substitutable products" is a
relatively broad concept. 9
The Asbestos case involved a claim by Canada not under Article
111:2 (just discussed) but under Article 111:4. This provision requires that
imported products
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.3O
As can be seen, Article 111:4 uses the term "like products" that has
already appeared in Article 111:2, but uses only that term and (in contrast
to Article 111:2) does not refer to the additional concept of "directly competitive or substitutable products." In the Asbestos case, as in other cases,
the use of "like products" in one way in Article 111:2 and in another way
in Article 111:4 can raise questions of interpretation. These questions are
examined further on in this discussion.
Canada's "like products" claim under the Article 111:4 provision
quoted above was to the effect that, while the French decree forbade the
sale of chrysotile asbestos products in France, it did not forbid the sale in
France of other, non-asbestos products which were "like" the asbestos
products. These other products, briefly, were derived not from chrysotile
asbestos fibers but from polyvinyl alcohol fibers, cellulose fibers, or
glass fibers. These non-asbestos-based products will be referred to as
"substitute products." The Canadian claim, then, was that asbestos-based
products and substitute products were "like products" but that, pursuant
to the French decree and in violation of Article 111:4, asbestos-based
products were accorded treatment less favorable than that accorded to
substitute products."
The panel found that asbestos-based and substitute products were
"like products;" that, pursuant to the French decree, the former had been
accorded less favorable treatment than the latter; and that the French decree therefore violated Article 111:4. To determine whether the two
categories of product were "like" for purposes of Article 111:4, the panel
relied to a substantial extent on a report issued by the Appellate Body in
29. An extensive discussion of these concepts is found under "H. Article 111:2" in the Alcoholic Beverages case. Id. at 18-31.
30. GATT 1994 Art. 111:4.
31. For the Canadian claim under Article 111:4, see the Asbestos Panel report, supra note
3,
8.101-.158.
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September 1996 in a case known
as Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (the
2
"Alcoholic Beverages case")

The Alcoholic Beverages case arose under Article 111:2 (not 111:4); it
involved taxes imposed by Japan on imported and domestic alcoholic
beverages. The level of taxation was higher for imported than for domestic beverages. The key issue was whether the imported and domestic
beverages were "like products" within the meaning of the first sentence
of Article 111:2, or "directly competitive or substitutable products" within
the meaning of the second sentence of Article 111:2. Substantially all of
the products in question were found to be either "like" or "directly competitive or substitutable," with the result that the tax regime was found to
be in violation of Article 111:2." 3
In the Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body had affirmed
the rejection by the panel in that case of an "aim and effects" test proposed by the United States and Japan to give meaning to the concept of
"like products" in Article III. Under this test, had it been adopted, a violation of Article 111:2 or Article 111:4 would depend on whether measures
discriminating between imported and domestic products had as their
purpose and as their trade effects the protection of the domestic products
against the imported products.34 Rather than adopt this approach, the Appellate Body had endorsed four criteria for determining whether
products are "like products." These four criteria can be summarized as
follows: (1) the physical properties of the products; (2) the extent to
which the products are susceptible of serving the same or similar enduses; (3) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products
as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy
a particular want or demand; and (4) the international tariff classification
of the products. 5
The panel in the Asbestos case used these four criteria as a framework for analyzing the question of whether, under Article 111:4, asbestos
products and substitute products are "like products. 3 6 The panel read
Alcoholic Beverages as giving panels an element of discretion ("un 616ment de jugement discr6tionnaire") in applying the four criteria." The
Appellate Body, the panel said, had accorded flexibility to panels in examining the question of likeness ("dans leur examen du principe de
32. See id. 8.112-.114; Alcoholic Beverages case, supra note 28.
33. See Alcoholic Beverages case, supra note 28, at 31-32 ("I. Conclusions and Recommendations").
34. See Robert E. Hudec, GATI/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for
an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 626-28 (1998).
35. See Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 101.
36. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, IT 8.113-. 150.
37. /d. T 8.114.
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similarit6")." The Asbestos panel decided that the four criteria were substantially interdependent, and that it was not appropriate to examine each
of them in isolation from the others. 39 In relying on Alcoholic Beverages,
an Article 111:2 case, the panel in effect merged the Article 111:2 concepts
of "like products" and "competitive or substitutable products," taken together, to arrive at a broad meaning of "like products" for purposes of
Article 111:4.40 The panel thus rejected an "extremely narrow" definition
of "like products" for purposes of Article 111:4, and said that, for products to be "like" under Article 111:4, it suffices that, for a given usage, the
properties of the products be the same to the point that one product can
replace another. ("II suffit que, dans une utilisation donn6e, les propri6t6s
4
'
soient les memes au point qu'un produit puisse remplacer l'autre.")
The Asbestos panel thus emphasized the second of the four Alcoholic Beverages critieria: the extent to which products, claimed to be
"like," are susceptible of serving the same or similar end-uses. The
panel's treatment of the other three criteria was less detailed. Having
analyzed the end-uses criterion as such, it analyzed the physicalproperties criterion to a large extent (but not exclusively) in terms of
end-uses. The panel was of the view that consumer preferences were not
a reliable criterion in the present case; and it attached little importance to
the matter of tariff classification, which differed for fibers but not for
certain fiber-based products 2
The EU (on behalf of France) had urged the panel to take the carcinogenic characteristics of chrysotile asbestos into account when
determining "likeness" on the basis of the physical-properties criterion.
The argument was that toxicity was one of the physical characteristics of
asbestos products and substitute products that was relevant to an appreciation of their "likeness." The toxicity of asbestos products, the EU
argued, renders them physically unlike substitute products. ("Un produit
dangereux doit etre consid6r6 comme pr6sentant une nature et une43
qualit6 diff6rentes d'un produit non dangereux ou moins dangereux.")

38. ld. 8.123.
39. Id. $ 8.115.
40. In id. 8.124, the panel cited the common consideration of the products in Report of
the Panel, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 116-17 (1987), irrespective of
whether they had been found "like products" or "competitive or substitutable products" in
Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 27, at 32, and referred to them as a group as "like products"
("produits similaires au sens de l'article 111:2"), adding that that case supported the panel's
approach under Article 111:4 ("Nous estimons que ce rapport confirme notre approche ...dans
le cadre de I'article 111:4 ....).
41. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 8.124.
42. See id. 1 8.117-.150.
43. /d.
%8.119.
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The panel rejected the EU argument, however, and declined to take
health considerations into account in determining "likeness" for purposes of Article 111:4. 44
The panel expressed three reasons for refusing to consider toxicity as
relevant to physical properties in the context of "like products" under
Article 111:4. The panel observed that in no previous WTO case had relative toxicity been considered a relevant physical characteristic for the
purpose of determining whether different products are "like products. 45
(Here, although the panel understandably did not make the point, it
might be observed that in the Alcoholic Beverages case, where the Appellate Body endorsed the four criteria for judging "likeness" in a case
involving toxic products, it was not claimed that different levels of taxation of imported and domestic alcoholic products might be legitimately
tied to different levels of toxicity.)
In addition, the panel stated that, for the purpose of applying the
physical-properties criterion under Article 111:4, the point at which
physical properties should be taken into account is that moment at which
asbestos products and substitute products may be interchangeably put to
the same end-use. ("C'est ce moment-l
qui nous int6resse, celui off elles
46
sont utilis6es i la meme fin.")
Finally, the panel was of the view that the very structure of the relevant multilateral trade agreement, namely, GATT 1994, dictated that a
matter of public health, here, the toxicity of asbestos products as compared to substitute products, be determined not in the context of Article
111:4, but in the context of Article XX(b), which deals expressly with the
subject of measures necessary to protect human health or life. The panel
said that it was reasoning in terms of the efficient allocation of subjectmatter within the structure of GATT 1994 ("la raison vient b.notre avis
de I'economie du GATT de 1994"), pursuant to which, the panel observed, the substantive provisions relating to issues of public health are
found in Article XX(b)."
On appeal, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's view that the
relative consequences for public health of asbestos products and substitute products should not be taken into account in determining whether
they are "like products" for purposes of Article 111:4. To reach the conclusion that "likeness" or "unlikeness" can be determined under Article
111:4 on the basis of relative toxicity, the Appellate Body had to deal with
several issues, including: (a) whether such a determination improperly
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. 11 8.130-.132.
d. 8.129.
/d.$ 8.125.
Id. $ 8.129-.132.
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intrudes on the intended purpose for which Article XX(b) was included
in GATT 1994; (b) the scope of "like products" in Article III:4; (c) the
application to asbestos products and substitute products of the four criteria of "likeness" found in the Alcoholic Beverages case; and (d) the
allocation of the burden of proof under Articles 111:4 and XX(b).
a. Respecting the Intended Purpose of Article XX(b)
The Appellate Body said that Article 111:4 should not be restricted
"simply because Article XX(b) exists and may be available to justify
measures inconsistent with Article 111:4." According to the Appellate
Body, the fact that using Article 111:4 "implies a less frequent recourse to
Article XX(b)" does not deprive the latter of its utility. Evidence relating
to health risks, the Appellate Body said (in italics) is relevant under Article 111:4 to "the competitive relationshipin the marketplace" of allegedly
"like" products, while the same evidence under Article XX(b) can be
invoked to justify a "WTO-inconsistent measure on the grounds of human health. 48
The Appellate Body thus reasoned that evidence relating to human
health, when it bears on competitive relationships in the marketplace,
can be considered under Article 111:4 in making a determination as to
"like products." In this manner, the Appellate Body rejected the reasoning of the panel to the effect that the very structure of GATT 1994
requires that measures adopted to protect human health should be evaluated solely under Article XX(b).
b. "Like Products" in Article 111:4
In substance, although not in language, the Appellate Body adopted
the panel's view of the scope of "like products" for purposes of Article
111:4. The panel had simply drafted its report as though "like products" in
Article 111:4 equals the sum of "like products" and "directly competitive
or substitutable products" in, respectively, the first and second sentences
of Article 111:2. To reach substantially the same result, the Appellate
Body referred to its image in earlier cases comparing the term "like
products" to an accordion which stretches or contracts in different places
in GATT 1994; declined "to define the precise scope of the word 'like' in
Article 111:4"; yet reached two conclusions--one being that "like" is
broader in Article 111:4 than in the first sentence of Article 111:2, the other
(buttressed by three italicized words) being that "like" in Article 111:4 is
"not broader than the combined product scope of the two sentences of
Article 11:2. '4
48. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, $ 115.
49. Id. [ 96-99.
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c. Applying the Four Criteria of "Likeness"
The key question for the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case was
whether asbestos products and substitute products are "like products."
The panel, applying the four criteria of "likeness" in the Alcoholic Beverages case, had answered the question in the affirmative. The Appellate
Body, applying the same criteria, seemed inclined to answer the question
in the negative, saying that the evidence presented to the panel "rather
tends to suggest that these products [asbestos products and substitute
products] are not 'like products' for the purposes of Article 111:4 . . .,0
To go from affirmative to negative, the Appellate Body effectively rejected the flexible approach taken by the panel in assessing and applying
the four criteria, and asserted that each of the four must be examined and
applied separately. The four-step approach of the Appellate Body can be
summarized, criterion by criterion, as follows.
i. Physical Characteristics
In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body was following its custom of
acting through a three-member Division of its membership (the "AB Division"). Two members said that toxicity should be subsumed under the
criterion of physical characteristics. So doing, these two members of the
AB Division were able to distinguish asbestos products from substitute
products on the ground that carcinogenic risk to human health is a physical property relevant to judging the competitive "likeness" of the two
categories of products. The third member of the AB Division-in a
"concurring statement" (which, in form, stopped short of being a separate concurring opinion)-implied that carcinogenic risk, instead of
being treated as a physical characteristic, should be viewed as a standalone, health-based fifth criterion for purposes of ruling on "likeness."5
The two members of the AB Division who did not agree with the
creation of a fifth, health-based criterion for "likeness" seemed to reason
that, conceptually and contextually, Article 111:4 deals exclusively with
economic, competitive relationships, and is not a provision intended to
govern the protection of human health. These two members of the AB
Division seemed to be saying that, given this construction of Article
111:4, the Appellate Body is entitled to create criteria for judging "likeness" only on the basis of economic, competitive relationships.
Apparently, therefore, two members of the AB Division, having adopted
this view as to the availability of criteria for judging "likeness," were
50. Id. $ 141.
149-54. Since the three members of the
51. The concurring statement is found in id. at
AB Division signed the Appellate Body report, it would have seemed logical for the concurring member to sign his statement and not leave his identity to guesswork.
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unwilling (in contrast to the concurring third member) to take the step
(in the words of the third member, the "small and modest step ' 5 2) of creating a fifth, health-based criterion for "likeness." Instead, these two
members reasoned that toxicity is relevant to "likeness" for purposes of,
and within the confines of,
53 the physical-characteristics criterion endorsed
Beverages.
Alcoholic
by
Thus, either by treating toxicity as a physical property and subsuming it under the physical-characteristics criterion for "likeness," or by
implying a fifth, health-based criterion for judging "likeness," the AB
Division tentatively concluded that carcinogenic asbestos products and
non-carcinogenic substitute products are not "like products." The AB
Division had stated, however, that each of the four criteria of Alcoholic
Beverages must be considered separately, and it therefore5 4 proceeded to
examine the other three in the manner summarized below.
ii. End-Uses

The Appellate Body was critical of the panel's examination of
whether asbestos products and substitute products have overlapping enduses. The panel, the Appellate Body said, only found that "the end-uses
...are the same 'for a small number' of applications," and failed to offer
any "elaboration on their nature and character." The Appellate Body
noted, moreover, that the record provided no evidence regarding enduses of asbestos and substitute products "which are not overlapping."
The Appellate Body therefore declined to rule on the significance of the
fact that asbestos and substitute products "share a small number of similar end-uses."55
iii. Consumer Preferences
The Appellate Body was even more critical of the manner in which
the panel examined, or failed to examine, the criterion of consumer preferences. The Appellate Body concluded that such an examination "is an
indispensable-although not, on its own, sufficient-aspect of any determination that products are 'like' .....

In reaching this conclusion,

the Appellate Body had this to say:
We do not wish to speculate on what the evidence regarding
these consumers [manufacturers of products including chrysotile
asbestos or PCG fibers] would have indicated; rather, we wish to
52. ld. 153.
53. On competitive relationships, see id. at 1199, 115-18.
54. See id. 1[109, 133.
55. Id.
137-38.
56. Id. $ 139.
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highlight that consumers' tastes and habits regarding fibres, even
in the case of commercial parties, such as manufacturers, are
very likely to be shaped by the health risks associated with a
product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A manufacturer cannot, for instance, ignore the preferences of the ultimate
consumer of its products. If the risks posed by a particular product are sufficiently great, the ultimate consumer may simply
cease to buy that product. This would, undoubtedly, affect a
manufacturer's decisions in the marketplace. Moreover, in the
case of products posing risks to human health, we think it likely
that manufacturers' decisions will be influenced by other factors,
such as the potential civil liability that might flow from marketing products posing a health risk to the ultimate consumer, or the
additional costs associated with safety procedures required to
use such products in the manufacturing process.57
With respect to the five sentences just quoted, the Appellate Body
cited no basis in the panel's report for its statements, and otherwise offered no footnotes or documentation for the last four sentences. The
Appellate Body appended the following footnote at the end of the first
sentence:
We recognize that consumers' reactions to products posing a risk
to human health vary considerably depending on the product,
and on the consumer. Some dangerous products, such as tobacco, are widely used, despite the known health risks. The
influence known dangers have on consumers' tastes and habits
is, therefore, unlikely to be uniform or entirely predictable.
Further on in its report, the Appellate Body had this to say about
consumer preferences:
We consider it likely that the presence of a known carcinogen in
one of the products will have an influence on consumers' taste
and habits regarding that product. It may be, for instance, that,
although cement-based products containing chrysotile asbestos
fibres are capable of performing the same functions as other cement-based products, consumers are, to a greater or lesser
extent, not willing to use products containing chrysotile asbestos
fibres because of the health risks associated with them. Yet, this
is only speculation; the point is, there is no evidence. We are of
the view that a determination on the "likeness" of the cement57. Id. 9 122 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. 1 122 n.103.
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based products cannot be made, under Article 111:4, in the absence of an examination of evidence on consumers' tastes and
habits. And, in this case, no such evidence has been submitted. 9
With respect to the five sentences just quoted, the Appellate Body offered no footnotes other than a footnote referring back to its own earlier
comments on consumer preferences.
iv. Tariff Classification
In effect, the Appellate Body added little to the panel's discussion of
the tariff-classification criterion. It noted the existence of different tariff
classifications for asbestos fibers and substitute fibers, and also noted
that the tariff classification is the same "for any given cement-based
product" ' irrespective of whether the product contains asbestos fibers or
substitute fibers. The Appellate Body declined to determine what importance should be attached to tariff classifications "[i]n the absence of a
full analysis, by the Panel, of the other three criteria addressed ....
In
other words, while the Appellate Body proceeded to "complete the
analysis" offered by the panel for the first three criteria, it declined so to
act as regards the fourth criterion.
2. Burden of Proof
The panel had briefly addressed the matter of comparative burden of
proof under Article 111:4 and under Article XX(b), and had concluded
that it made no significant difference whether the EU had the burden of
disputing "likeness" under Article 111:4 on the basis of the threat that asbestos products pose for human health, or had the burden of showing
that, under Article XX(b), France was entitled to prohibit the importation
of asbestos on the basis of that same threat. ("Certes, la charge de la
preuve ne serait sans doute pas sensiblement modifi6e dans la mesure oii
les [Communaut6s Europ6ennes] auraient toujours a apporter la preuve
de la dangerosit662 du produit, en application de 1'adage probatio incumbit
ejus que dixit.")
The Appellate Body did not directly address this statement by the
panel that, irrespective of the rubric under which the EU's claim of a
health threat ("dangerosit6 du produit") was judged, the burden of proving that claim would be on the EU (on "ejus que dixit"); nor did the
Appellate Body otherwise compare the burden of proof for the EU under
59. Id. 145 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. 146.
61. Id. [124.
62. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3,
the burden of proof is on the claimant.

8.130. Roughly translated, the adage says that
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Article 111:4 and under Article XX(b). That is, the Appellate Body did
not directly comment on the panel's observation that the burden of proof
would not be significantly changed ("sensiblement modifi6e") as between showing "unlikeness" on grounds of a threat to human health
(Article 111:4), or justifying the prohibitions in the French decree on the
same grounds (Article XX(b)).
Rather, the comments of the Appellate Body on burden of proof
were substantially limited to the "very heavy burden ... placed on Canada" to prove "likeness" under Article 111:4, once the carcinogenic nature
of asbestos products is taken into account. In particular, the Appellate
Body observed that, it being "clear" that the two categories of products
(asbestos products and substitute products) "have very different [physical] properties ...because chrysotile is a known carcinogen, a very
heavy burden is placed on Canada to show, under the second and third
criteria [end-uses; consumer preferences], that [asbestos products and
substitute products] are in ... a competitive relationship., 63 This approach to burden of proof has the following elements. It relates to the
burden of the complaining party (Canada) to prove "likeness" under Article 111:4 by showing a "competitive relationship" between asbestos
products and substitute products. It is premised on the carcinogenic nature of asbestos products and the non-carcinogenic nature of substitute
products. The burden on the party seeking to show "likeness" is "very
heavy" because that party must show, notwithstanding the carcinogenic
feature of asbestos products, that those products have overlapping enduses with, and appeal to the same consumer preferences as, substitute
products that are not known carcinogens.
This approach to burden of proof seems to be interrelated with the
views of the Appellate Body on the criteria for showing "likeness." It
seems to be to the effect that, because the carcinogenic nature of asbestos products makes them physically "unlike" substitute products, the
complaining party has a "very heavy burden" to prove that, under the
end-uses and consumer-preferences criteria, asbestos products are "like"
substitute products. If this reading of the Appellate Body's treatment of
burden of proof is correct, then the subject was dealt with only as to
Canada's burden to show "likeness" in the context of the second and
third criteria (end-uses; consumer preferences), and only after a presumption of "unlikeness" had been raised on the ground that the
carcinogenic nature of asbestos products constitutes a physical property
under the first criterion.

63. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, T 118.
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3. Article XI-Non-Tariff Barrier
Before the panel, Canada had claimed that the French decree violated not only Article 111:4 but also Article XI's prohibition against nontariff barriers. 6' In response, the EU had argued that only Article 111:4, to
the exclusion of Article XI, was applicable to the French decree. The EU
argument was to the effect that the decree was an internal French regulation applicable to both domestic and imported products, that it was not a
measure covering only the importation of products, and that it therefore
fell under Article 111:4. According to the EU, under established GATT
practice, if a measure applies to both domestic and imported products, it
is governed by Article III:4. 65 Canada, on the other hand, took the further
position that, if the decree cannot be considered under both Article 111:4
and Article XI, it should be evaluated as a quantitative restriction in violation of Article XL,since, considered overall, the essence of the decree
is to erect a non-tariff barrier against imports. ("Considr6 d'une mani~re
globale, le D6cret porte, de par sa substance et son caractbre v6ritable,
sur les importations.")6
This Article XI controversy was not resolved. The panel upon finding a violation of Article 111:4 found it unnecessary to reach Article XI.
The Appellate Body, reversing the panel as to Article 111:4 and affirming
as to Article XX(b), did not deal with Article XI.
4. Article XX(b)-Human Life or Health
Both the panel and the Appellate Body determined that the French
decree was a measure necessary to protect human life or health and, as
such, came under the ambit of Article XX(b). The panel relied on expert
testimony relating to the deadly nature of, and measures necessary to
protect the public from fatal diseases caused by, chrysotile asbestos. The
panel report reviewed this testimony in some detail.67 In large part, the
Appellate Body relied on the panel report in this connection, observed
that the panel enjoyed considerable discretion in the evaluation of the
testimony in question, and concluded that the panel had not abused its
discretion. 6 According to the Appellate Body:

64. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 3.394.
65. Id. fi 3.395-.396. The EU was relying on language found in Ad Article Ill of GATT
1994.

66. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 1 3.467-.468, 3.470.
67. The testimony and related text are extensive, covering almost 200 single-spaced
pages in the panel report (entitled Consultation du groupe spdcial avec des experts scientifiques), plus an Addendum, supra note 16, of over 200 single-spaced pages. See Asbestos
Panel report, supra note 3,91 5.1-659.
68. See Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, 11 162-63.
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The Panel enjoyed a margin of discretion in assessing the value
of the evidence, and the weight to be ascribed to that evidence.
The Panel was entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to determine that certain elements of evidence should be accorded
more weight than other elements-that is the essence of the task
of appreciating the evidence. 9
In particular, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel's rejection of the
Canadian argument based on the "controlled use" of asbestos products.
Here, the panel had concluded that France, in formulating its decree,
could reasonably conclude that "controlled use" was not a "reasonably
available" measure for dealing with asbestos products.70
5. The TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement (dealing with technical barriers to trade) is one
of the agreements that was prepared in connection with, and that came
into effect upon, the creation of the WTO. One of its recitals indicates
that it was drafted to "further the objectives of GATT 1994," and another
of its recitals sets out language identical to language found in Article XX
of GATT 1994 (relating, among other things, to measures necessary for
the protection of human life or health).7'
Canada argued that the French decree constituted a technical regulation incompatible with the TBT Agreement.7 2 The panel dismissed this
argument on the ground that the relevant portion of the French decree
was not a technical regulation but a general prohibition of asbestos products.73 The Appellate Body, noting that another portion of the French
decree contains exceptions to the general prohibition, reversed the panel
on this point, and ruled that the French decree, taken as a whole, does
constitute a technical regulation for purposes of the TBT Agreement.74
Having done this, however, the Appellate Body did not decide75whether
the French decree does or does not violate the TBT Agreement.
The Appellate Body thus declined to rule on Canada's claim under
the TBT Agreement. Its inaction in this regard seems to have had two
bases. First, the panel had made no findings in respect of the Canadian
claim. Second, according to the Appellate Body, the meaning of the "obligations" in the TBT Agreement, as well as in a predecessor agreement
under the old GATT, had never been construed by any GATT or WTO
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. T 161.
Id. 11173-75.
TBT Agreement pmbl., second and sixth recitals, respectively.
See Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 1 3.245-.249.
See id. $T 8.39, 8.72-73.
Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, T1 64-76.
Id. 11 78-83.
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panel, or by the Appellate Body itself. 6 Leaving the Canadian claim in
limbo thus appears to have been consistent with a tradition of not
supplying interpretations of the "obligations" in the TBT Agreement.

COMMENTARY

There follows a commentary on the aspects of the Asbestos case set
out above. Its focus is the relationship between the panel and the Appellate Body in the case itself and, more generally, in the context of WTO
dispute settlement.
1. "Like Products"
As discussed above, the panel gave "like products" in Article 111:4
the same scope given to both "like products" and "directly competitive
and substitutable products" in the Appellate Body's report in the Alcoholic Beverages case, and took a flexible approach in applying the four
criteria endorsed by that case for determining "likeness." So doing, the
panel determined that asbestos products and substitute products are "like
products" at the critical point when their properties are evaluated in
terms of their end-uses. Also as discussed above, the Appellate Body
provided an exegesis on the variable scope of "likeness," announced that
each of the four criteria of the Alcoholic Beverages case must be applied
separately, announced that toxicity is a physical property for purposes of
applying the first of those criteria, declined (by two votes to one in the
AB Division) to announce that toxicity is a separate, fifth criterion, observed that the panel had not provided sufficient information on the
degree to which asbestos products and substitute products do and do not
have overlapping end-uses, speculated on consumer preferences as between asbestos products and substitute products, and in the course of its
analysis suggested that they are not "like products."
The Appellate Body seems to have hesitated between two different
ways to deal with the issue of "like products." One apparent line of
reasoning was that the toxicity of asbestos products affects their ability
to compete economically with substitute products to the point that, given
the competitive, economic framework of Article 111:4, the two categories
of product cannot be considered "like" for purposes of Article 111:4."
The other and quite different line of reasoning was that the panel report
failed to supply sufficient evidence under the four criteria to support a
finding that asbestos products and substitute products are "like"
76. Id. 18 1.
77. See id.
99, 113-16.
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products."' Formally, the Appellate Body can be said to have concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Canadian argument for
"like products."7 9 Substantively, however, the Appellate Body's reasoning
as to "likeness" seems to have rested squarely on the toxicity of asbestos
products. This apparent ambiguity as to the underlying reason(s) for
Appellate Body's conclusion-was it toxicity, or was it lack of
evidence?-merits further analysis, because the panel should be able to
understand, and future panels should be able to understand, why the
Appellate Body came to the conclusion that it did as to "likeness."
Moreover, either of those reasons has important implications for
WTO jurisprudence. Has the law of "likeness" been changed so that
toxic products are "unlike" non-toxic products when toxicity is viewed
as a physical characteristic in the context of the first of the Alcoholic
Beverages criteria? Or, notwithstanding the view that toxicity is a firstcriterion physical characteristic, would the report of the Asbestos panel
have found favor with the Appellate Body had the panel scrupulously set
out the evidence of "likeness" in some detail separately for each of the
four criteria? The Appellate Body's analysis is not particularly helpful in
answering these questions. Its accordion imagery as to "likeness" was
merely a step toward the strangely worded and unnecessary dictum that
"like products" in Article 111:4 is not a broader concept than the combined concepts of "like products" and "directly competitive or
substitutable products" in Article 111:2.' (The dictum may also be inaccurate, given the breadth of Article IlI:4-"all laws, regulations and
requirements"-compared to that of Article Ill:2-"internal taxes.")
Here, a word about the four criteria seems in order. There are, for
present purposes, but three, because neither the panel nor the Appellate
Body attached any significance to the fourth criterion relating to tariff
classification. Of the three, it would seem that toxicity considered only
as a physical characteristic under the first criterion is insufficient to establish "unlikeness." Otherwise, why did the Appellate Body insist on
separately examining the second and third criteria? In this connection, it
would seem that it examined the second criterion, end-uses, to show the
inadequacy of the record as to "likeness," but that its discussion of the
third criterion, consumer preferences, was intended to buttress a conclusion based on toxicity.

78.
79.
80.
81.

See id fl 118, 145, 147.
See id.
I 192(c), (d).
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 57, and 59.
See Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra note 4, $188, 96, 99.
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2. Toxicity
As has been mentioned, the two prevailing members of the AB Division seemed to be of the opinion that toxicity can be considered under
Article 111:4 only as it relates to competitive, economic relationships, and
cannot be considered there as it relates to measures adopted to protect
human life and health. Although the Appellate Body did not say so, this
view does not seem so different from the view of the panel to the effect
that the proper context for considering human life and health is not Article 111:4 but Article XX(b). Restricting itself to viewing toxicity in terms
of its effect on economic competition, the Appellate Body, in its discussion of the second criterion, speculated on how consumers choose
between toxic asbestos products, and non-toxic substitute products. It
did not attempt to substantiate this speculation. Indeed, the only footnote
in support of the Appellate Body's speculation on consumer reactions to
the dangers of asbestos pointed out that tobacco is widely known to be a
dangerous product, and that, despite this, consumer reactions are neither
uniform nor predictable. 2
Much of the Appellate Body's second-criterion speculation seems
questionable. The Appellate Body suggested that manufacturerconsumers would be deterred by a lack of a market for asbestos products, or by fear of civil liability, or by additional costs associated with
safety procedures. One can question, however, whether the French decree would have been necessary or would have become the subject of
dispute if there were no French market for asbestos products. In addition, one can as easily speculate that manufacturers using asbestos
products would consider civil liability or safety procedures as costs of
doing business, and would take these factors into account in pricing their
own products. For better or worse, it is not inconceivable that there is a
substantial market for asbestos products, notwithstanding their known
carcinogenic properties.
Speculation either way misses a fundamental point, namely, that
measures taken to protect human life and health are rarely adopted on
the basis of consumer preferences. Rather, they are adopted on the basis
of decisions by public authorities as to what is in the public interest.
Consumers may prefer unfettered access to this or that product harmful
to human health. Notwithstanding such a preference, public authorities,
exercising their judgment as to what is in the public interest, step in and
deny unfettered access by would-be consumers to certain harmful products. Tobacco (the only product mentioned in the Appellate Body's only
relevant footnote on the point) is illustrative (indeed, the footnote on the
82. ld.

122 n.103.
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unpredictability of consumer preferences is more on point than the
speculative text to which it is attached).83 Laws regulating consumer access to tobacco are not promoted by would-be consumers of tobacco
products; they are the work of persons concerned with human health.
Even more telling examples exist of public-health measures that flout
consumer preferences, relating to quite strict prohibitions involving
products that are deemed to be more harmful than tobacco 4
This point is not unrelated to the view of the panel that the provision
of GATT 1994 applicable to toxicity is Article XX(b), dealing with
measures necessary to protect human life and health. Whatever the merit
of the panel's views as to the structure of GATT 1994, the Appellate
Body does seem to have taken itself rather far afield by attempting to
deal with "likeness" through speculation that would correlate toxicity
with consumer preferences. To the extent that the Appellate Body's conclusion as to "likeness" is based on its speculation as to consumer
preferences, the basis for the conclusion is not convincing.
3. Evidence as to "Likeness"
As mentioned above, the Appellate Body states in its report that the
panel failed to provide adequate evidence that asbestos products and
substitute products are "like products." This evidentiary point was raised
in particular as regards the second criterion, that is, the end-uses of the
two categories of products. The panel, the Appellate Body said, contented itself with establishing the bare fact that the end-uses of the two
categories are the same for "a small number" of applications, and did not
attempt to evaluate the applications for which the two categories do and
do not have overlapping end-uses. 5 It is thus strongly implied that the

83. Information on the regulation of tobacco in the United States can be found on the
website of the National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion: Tobacco Information and Prevention Source, Selected Actions of the U.S. Government Regarding
the Regulation of Tobacco Sales, Marketing, and Use, at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
overview/regulate.htm; Tobacco Information and Prevention Source, State Laws on Tobacco
Control-United States, 1998 (June 25, 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
research data/legal-policy/mmwrss699.htm; Tobacco Information and Prevention Source,
State Laws on Tobacco Control-United States, 1998: MMWR Highlights (June 25, 1999),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/research data/legal-policy/mmwr699fs.htm.
84. See, e.g., Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
85. The panel actually said the following:
[M]8me si les utilisations finales des fibres de chrysotile d'une part et les fibres
[competitives] d'autre part ne sont les mmes que dans une faible partie de leurs
applications respectives, il y a des circonstances obi ces applications sont similaires.
A ce moment leurs propridtds sont dquivalents, sinon identiques ....
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two categories cannot be found to be "like products" for the purpose of
Article 111:4 because the evidence adduced by the panel to show "like-

ness" was inadequate.
This evidentiary and procedural reasoning is rather different from a

finding of "unlikeness" on grounds of toxicity in one category but not
the other. It seems to require substantial evidence of overlapping enduses to support a conclusion that the two categories have been shown to
be "like." When one reads the reports of the panel and the Appellate

Body, including the presentations of Canada and the EU, as a whole,
however, this evidentiary reasoning as to end-uses seems rather thin. The
arguments of the parties and the French decree itself seem premised on
the proposition that, were asbestos products freely admitted into France,
they would be put to a great many end-uses, no small number of which
would be highly competitive with the end-uses of substitute products.
The record suggests that unrestricted access to asbestos products would
reveal a variety of potential end-uses for those products8 6 Moreover, it
would seem that overlapping end-uses, actual and potential, can shift
over time, depending on technology and market opportunity, and that,
health considerations to one side, asbestos products would not be restricted in competing with substitute products. In short, the Appellate

Body's extrapolation of the "small number" of overlapping end-uses into
a major evidentiary flaw seems somewhat artificial.
The discussion of end-uses by the Appellate Body seems artificial
because it sidesteps the question of whether asbestos products are
commercially substitutable for relevant non-asbestos products; that is,
whether, in the absence of health-based legal restrictions on the

importation and use of asbestos products, they would be imported and
used as substitutes for the non-asbestos products to which they are being

Nous avons d6j constatd ci-dessus que les propri6t~s respectives des fibres de chrysotile d'une part et des fibres [competitives] d'autre part permettaient certaines
utilisations finales identiques ou du moins similaires.... [A] notre avis, le fait que
toutes les utilisations finales de ces fibres ne soient pas similaires ne suffit pas . en
faire des produits non similaires.
Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, $ 8.125, 8.136 (footnote omitted). It can be argued
that the Appellate Body failed to do justice to this text indicating that the panel, on evaluating
end-uses, concluded (a) that there were a sufficient number of overlapping end-uses to render
asbestos products and substitute products "like," and (b) that the fact that all of the end-uses
were not "like" did not operate to make the two categories of product "unlike."
86. Both Canada and the EU emphasized the large number of end-uses for asbestos products. Canada referred to "3000 applications" and elaborated thereon. The EU commented on
the many uses for asbestos and the extremely broad range of products containing asbestos that
are put on the market ("[C]ompte tenu des multiples applications de l'amiante, l'dventail des
produits mis sur le march6 en contenant a dtd extr~mement large"). Id. 113.21, 3.23.
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compared.87 As a commercial matter, the question of overlapping enduses turns on product substitutability in the marketplace. The panel
report clearly shows that both Canada and the EU considered the
relevant non-asbestos products to be substitutable for asbestos products.88
Thus, the record in the Asbestos case clearly supports the proposition
that the relevant non-asbestos products are substitutable for asbestos
products. It would, therefore, seem indisputable that, on the basis of this
record, the reverse proposition is true, namely, that asbestos products are
substitutable for the relevant non-asbestos products. This being so, it is
difficult to understand why the Appellate Body, in its discussion of enduses, sidestepped a record showing that asbestos products are actual or
potential substitutes for the relevant non-asbestos products. The
Appellate Body's treatment of the lack of evidence as to "likeness"
seems to distort the second criterion on end-uses. Given the overall
record in the Asbestos case, it seems clear that, but for laws based on
their carcinogenic properties, asbestos products would occupy a
substantial place in commerce and hence in multilateral trade. On the
point of overlapping end-uses, it thus seems clear that, but for those
laws, asbestos products would represent an important commercial
standard by which other products would be measured for a not
inconsiderable number of end-uses.
4. "Aim and Effects" Test
As mentioned above,8 9 in the Alcoholic Beverages case the Appellate
Body had affirmed a panel's rejection of a proposed "aim and effects"
test whereby "likeness" under Article III would turn on whether the aim
and trade effects of a measure were protectionist of domestic products
against imported products. It is interesting to note that, had this test been
adopted and thus been available in the Asbestos case, the panel in that
case might have disposed of the case under Article 111:4, and might not
have had to reach Article XX(b). Because the French decree did not discriminate against imported products in order to protect domestic
products, it presumably would not have been found in violation of the
"aim and effects" test and, for this reason, imported asbestos products
might not have been found by the panel to be "like products" for purposes of Article 111:4. Use of "aim and effects," had it been made

87. The non-asbestos products here relevant are derived from polyvinyl alcohol fibers, or
cellulose fibers, or glass fibers, and are referred to herein as "substitute products." See supra
text preceding note 31.
88. For Canada, see, for example, Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 91 3.28, 3.45 (b).
For the EU, see, for example, id. 1 3.426, 3.428.
89. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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available by the Appellate Body, could have greatly facilitated the search
for an Article 111:4 rationale for disposing of Asbestos.
5. Non-Tariff Barrier
If the panel's evidentiary failure (as asserted by the Appellate Body)
means that asbestos products and substitute products have no material
overlapping end-uses, then it might well follow that (for purposes of the
Asbestos case) asbestos products are unique, and that the French decree
is a non-tariff barrier to their importation which is inconsistent with Article XI. As mentioned above, Canada instituted a claim that the French
decree created a non-tariff barrier inconsistent with Article XI-a claim
which was dealt with by neither the panel nor the Appellate Body. The
panel found this claim extraneous to its findings that the French decree
(1) was a violation of Article 111:4, but (2) was justified under Article
XX(b) as a measure necessary to protect human life or health. The Appellate Body (having overturned the panel's Article 111:4 ruling) gave no
explanation for not ruling on the Article XI claim. Even so, by upholding
the panel with respect to Article XX(b), the Appellate Body, without giving any rationale for passing by the Article XI claim in silence, could
have had an Article XX(b) rationale for doing so.
There are two problems with positing such a sub silencio rationale.
The first is that it assumes, in the absence of panel findings, that Article
XI forbids France from subjecting the importation of asbestos products
from Canada to non-tariff "prohibitions or restrictions" of the type found
in the French decree. A reading of the bare text of Article XI would appear to be consistent with this conclusion, but the Article XI claim was
not critical to the approach adopted by the panel and therefore was not
discussed by it. 90
For present purposes, the second problem is more pertinent. Had the
Appellate Body addressed the issue of whether the French decree was a
violation of Article XI, the Appellate Body would not have been able to
dispose of this issue on the ground that asbestos products and substitute
products are not "like products." The entire "like products" analysis engaged in by the Appellate Body under Article 111:4 would have been beside
the point under Article XI. An Article XI violation, had one been found,
would have sent the Appellate Body directly into Article XX(b)-the very

90. Article XI:I of GATT 1994 reads as follows: "No prohibitions or restrictions other
than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party .... "The panel did
not consider this text, or the text of Ad Article Ill of GATT 1994, relied on by the EU (see
supra text accompanying note 65).
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provision, of course, upon which the panel had ultimately rested its report.
6. "Measures Necessary to Protect Human Life or Health"
The French decree was concerned not with the three criteria of
"likeness" relied on by the Appellate Body, but with the protection of
human life and health. It was concerned not with the relative competitive
aspects of toxicity viewed as a physical characteristic, not with evidence
as to particular overlapping end-uses, and certainly not with consumer
preferences. Quite irrespective of these factors, the French decree was
adopted to protect human life and health by preventing a known carcinogen from being imported into or used in France.
The panel report, by moving rather efficiently into Article XX(b),
was informed by the purpose of the French decree and, with an economy
of effort, was drafted to evaluate the decree in terms of its manifest objective. Did the panel thereby fail to tarry any longer than it deemed
absolutely necessary on the issue of "likeness"? Did it simply assume
that there was at least some significant market for some asbestos products that were competitive with substitute products? These questions
may slight the not inconsiderable attention given by the panel to the
question of "likeness." Even so, it is tempting to think of the panel as
looking upon the "likeness" debate as a somewhat arcane diversion from
efficiently disposing of the French decree in terms of its stated objective
and pursuant to that provision of GATT 1994 which expressly covers
that objective.
The approach adopted by the panel raises two substantive legal issues, each of which is mentioned in the panel report. The first is whether
the structure of GATT 1994 dictates the approach taken by the panel in
dealing with a measure adopted to protect human life or health. The second is whether, in contrast to Article 111:4, Article XX(b) places an undue
burden of proof on the party to a trade dispute that is called upon to justify a trade barrier on the basis of the protection of human life or health.
a. The Structure of GATT 1994
It cannot be said that the panel's views are altogether lacking in
merit. GATT 1994 follows the structure of the old GATT and brings with
it over fifty years of jurisprudence. 9' GATT 1994 is designed to remove
barriers to trade and, at the same time, to recognize that there are legitimate purposes which constitute exceptions to that objective and which
justify certain policy-oriented barriers to trade. In its general structure,
91. See

PALMETER & MAVROIDIS,

supra note 2, at 1-18.
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GATT 1994 first creates violations of WTO law that arise when specified

barriers to trade are erected, and then sets out exceptions to those violations, the exceptions being grounded in specifically recognized
92
policies. Frequently, therefore, a case involving a trade dispute deals,
first, with an alleged violation raised by the complaining party and, second, with a specific exception claimed by the defending party as a

justification for the violation. For this reason, a defending party to a
WTO trade dispute will frequently both deny an alleged violation and
have recourse to one of the exceptions in order to justify the violation.
A highly relevant example is the 1996 report of the Appellate Body

in a case involving clean-air environmental standards adopted by the
United States for fuel additives (the "Gasoline Additives case").93 Briefly,
the United States had adopted stricter environmental standards for foreign gasoline refiners than for domestic gasoline refiners; Brazil and
Venezuela had complained under Article 111:4; and the United States had
invoked one of the General Exceptions in Article XX-the exception
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" 94-the
claimed natural resource being clean air. The panel had found a violation
of Article 111:4, and the United States had not appealed this finding. The
issue before the Appellate Body, therefore, was whether the violation
was justified under the claimed exception. The Appellate Body found
that the U.S. measures in question were indeed "measures relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources." The Appellate Body then

found, however, that the discriminatory feature of the U.S. measures,
being stricter for foreign refiners than for domestic refiners, was incon-

sistent with the introductory clause of Article XX. 95

92. "General Exceptions" are found in GATT 1994 Article XX relating to (a) public morals, (b) human, animal or plant life or health, (c) trade in gold or silver, (d) securing
compliance with domestic laws and regulations, (e) prison labor, (f) the protection of cultural
treasures, (g) conserving exhaustible natural resources, (h) obligations under commodity
agreements, (i) assuring domestic access to essential materials, () dealing with products in
short supply. "Security Exceptions" are found in Article XXI.
93. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter
Gasoline Additives case].
94. GATT 1994 Art. XX(g).
95. The introductory clause (also known as the chapeau) reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement [GATT 1994] shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of [the following] measures.
GATT 1994 Art. XX chapeau. In the case of Article XX(b), the words following this clause
are: "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
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The introductory clause of Article XX is designed to prevent trade
protectionism in the guise of a measure that, ostensibly, serves an otherwise valid and recognized public policy, such as safeguarding the
environment, or human life or health. Thus, to qualify as an exception
under Article XX, a measure may not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate "between countries where the same conditions prevail," and
may not be "a disguised restriction on international trade." In the Gasoline Additives case, the Appellate Body found that the discriminatory
feature of the U.S. regulations there at issue-which were stricter for
foreign than for domestic refiners-rendered them an arbitrary and unjustifiable form of protectionism of domestic refiners as against foreign
refiners,• 96and a disguised restriction on international trade in refined
gasoline.
The panel in the Asbestos case was quite cognizant of the implications of the Gasoline Additives case for dealing with the French decree
under Article XX(b). The panel cited and referred to Gasoline Additives
in scrupulous detail, and expressly couched its reasoning in terms of the
conditions found in the introductory paragraph of Article XX as they
apply to a measure claimed to be within the ambit of Article XX(b). 97
Moreover, the panel was urged by two countries that filed third-party
briefs in the Asbestos case, Brazil and Zimbabwe, to take the position
that the French decree was in effect an abuse of Article XX(b), and was
more restrictive of international trade than was required in order to safeguard human life or health in France.9"
Thus, by disposing of the Asbestos case under Article XX(b), the
panel was dealing with a provision that required the EU (acting on behalf of France) to demonstrate that the French decree, first, was
necessary for the protection of human life or health and, second, was not
a trade-protectionist measure in the guise of a measure for the protection
of human life or health. To meet the first requirement, the EU provided
substantial evidence and testimony to establish the carcinogenic threat
posed by asbestos products. 99 To meet the second requirement, the EU
could point to the text of the French decree itself, which applies its prohibitions equally to all asbestos products, domestic or foreign, and (in
the language of the introductory paragraph of Article XX) does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate "between countries where the same
96. Gasoline Additives case, supra note 93, at 20-27 ("IV. The Introductory Provisions of
Article XX of the General Agreement: Applying the Chapeau of the General Exceptions").
97. See Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, '1 8.227, 8.235-.237. These conditions were
referred to as "le contr6le qu'exerce le paragraphe introductif de I'article XX sur les abus
dventuels de l'article XX(b) dans I'application de lamesure." Id. 8.130.
98. Id. '14.1 -. 45 (Brazil),
4.75-98 (Zimbabwe).
99. ld. 1 5.574-.581.
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conditions prevail."' ° Under the French decree, any country producing
asbestos products faces the same prohibitions.
These two requirements imposed on the EU to justify the French decree pursuant to Article XX(b) have been seen by certain commentators
as unduly burdensome. Thus, when the Appellate Body reversed the
panel on the matter of "like products" under Article 111:4, these commentators were of the view that the WTO had made it less burdensome to
justify measures for the protection of human life or health-and, by extension, measures for the protection of the environment-and had
thereby moved in a welcome and salutary direction. The comments were
to the effect that a country defending such measures before the WTO
would have an easier task, in terms of burden of proof, in showing that
products were not "like products" under Article 111:4 than in meeting the
double requirement (just discussed) of Article XX(b).' ° '
Possibly anticipating this line of reasoning, the panel had briefly observed that, for purposes of burden of proof, it made no significant
difference whether the EU was required to show "unlikeness" under Article 111:4, or was required to meet the requirements of Article XX(b). 02
In addition, according to the panel, because Article XX(b) is subject to
the conditions found in the introductory paragraph of Article XX (described above), in applying Article XX(b), the panel was following the
principle laid down by the Appellate Body in earlier cases to give effect
to all provisions ("donner sens i toutes les dispositions") of GATT
'
1994. 03
Even so, the Appellate Body reversed the panel. The questions
thus arise, was the panel correct as to burden of proof, or was the Appellate Body correct in reversing the panel on the issue of "likeness"?
b. Burden of Proof
Under WTO case law, the party bringing a complaint has the burden
of bringing forth evidence to make out a prima facie case substantiating
the complaint. Once the complaining party has made out such a case, the
burden then shifts to the defending party to bring forth evidence to the
contrary. It is for the panel hearing the case to decide when the burden
shifts. This decision is subject to appeal to the Appellate Body. There is
no WTO case law as to which party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, a matter that is left to the several panels on a case-by-case basis and
that is also subject to appeal.'"
100. See id. 8.223-.224.
101. See NGO Commentaries, supra note 11.
102. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 3, 8.130.
103. Id.
104. These statements as to WTO case law are based on the Report of the Appellate
Body, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
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In the Asbestos case, in respect of Canada's claim that asbestos
products and substitute products are "like products" within the meaning
of Article 111:4, Canada had the burden of producing evidence making
out a prima facie case to that effect, and, in the event Canada met that
burden, the EU (on behalf of France) had the burden of producing contrary evidence to establish that the two categories of products are not
"like products." The panel, looking basically at that moment when the
two categories of products are put to the same end use, determined that
Canada had made out a case for "likeness" and the EU had not made out
a case for "unlikeness."
The Appellate Body did not agree with the criterion used by the
panel in judging "likeness" versus "unlikeness," and effectively changed
that criterion. According to the Appellate Body, each of the four criteria
(only three of which were in fact invoked) from the Alcoholic Beverages
case should be examined separately, and in the course of this examination toxicity should be considered a physical property for the purpose of
weighing the relative competitiveness of the two categories of products.
The Appellate Body thus reversed the panel not on the issue of burden of
proof, but on the issue of the proper criterion for judging the type of
proof required.
The panel had required proof in the context of one criterion. The
Appellate Body ruled that the panel had should have required proof in a
materially different context. Accordingly, the question of burden of proof
was not addressed by the panel within the framework deemed applicable
by the Appellate Body. Unable to send the case back to the panel, 05 the
Appellate Body purported to "complete the analysis" undertaken by the
panel. At this point, the issue of burden of proof comes unraveled in the
Asbestos case. The Appellate Body said two things: one, that toxicity
should be considered when judging the competitiveness of the two categories of products; two, that when this factor is taken into account the
complaining party (Canada) failed to adduce sufficient evidence as to
"likeness." The issue of burden of proof thereupon becomes unraveled
because, of course, Canada was never given an opportunity to bring forth
evidence under the standard established by the Appellate Body on appeal. There is, therefore, no way of knowing whether, when Canada was
presenting its case to the panel, it would then have made out a prima facie case that, viewed in terms of relative competitiveness and taking into
account the toxicity of asbestos products, they are, notwithstanding their
toxicity, competitively "like" substitute products.
India, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr. I (April 25 and May 27, 1997), at 11-15 (IV. "Burden of
Proof').
105. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 2, at 147-52.
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A reading of the French decree and of the record in the Asbestos
case suggests that asbestos products, notwithstanding their toxicity, may
well be competitive with substitute products. The Appellate Body's
speculative comments on consumer tastes do little to dispel the inference
that consumers, cognizant of the fact that chrysotile asbestos is a deadly
carcinogen, will nonetheless use asbestos products for the very reason
that they are competitive with substitute products. In short, it seems quite
speculative to assume that, had Canada, before the panel, been asked to
make out a prima facie case of "likeness" under the standard established
by the Appellate Body on appeal, Canada would have failed to do so. In
the event that Canada had succeeded in doing so, then the burden of
showing "unlikeness" would have shifted to the EU.
Guesswork as to what might have happened is an unsatisfactory way
of dealing with the issue of burden of proof. Even so, one can ask
whether, in terms of burden of proof, the Appellate Body made a constructive contribution to WTO law by coming forward with its new basis
for judging whether a complaining party has made out a prima facie
case. It is far from clear that the Appellate Body did act constructively. In
an area where the defending party seems to have a genuine concern with
protecting human life and health, the defending party, instead of arguing
directly to that concern, is placed by the Appellate Body in the position
of having to refute the competitiveness of products notwithstanding their
threat to human health. Competitiveness is not the issue. Making it the
issue diverts the parties and the panel from the central question of protecting human life and health.
Indeed, the analysis provided by the Appellate Body could make it
more difficult, not easier, to deal with measures taken to protect human
life and health, or to protect the environment. These are not measures
readily susceptible of being judged in terms of relative competitiveness
under Article 111:4. As the Asbestos panel pointed out, these are measures
expressly covered (as to human health) in Article XX(b). The panel was
thus able to suggest that going directly to Article XX(b) placed no
greater burden of proof on the EU than it would have faced under Article
111:4 in attempting to rebut a prima facie case as to "likeness."
There is, of course, a further element in Article XX (mentioned by
the panel), which is its introductory clause as interpreted by the Appellate Body in the Gasoline Additives case. Under that clause, a measure
that ostensibly is designed to protect (for example) human health or the
environment may not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
"countries where the same conditions prevail," or constitute a "disguised
restriction on international trade." There may be advocates of environmental or other causes who would like to revise this provision. On its
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face, however, it has the merit of holding human life, health, or environmental measures to a standard of genuineness and fairness, and of not
permitting them to be used to mask trade protectionism. In any event, the
provision was invoked and elaborated on by the Appellate Body in the
Gasoline Additives case. Revising it would probably bring into play interests on both sides of the issue. For example, given the position taken
by Brazil and Zimbabwe in the Asbestos case'0 6 and the position taken by
many developing nations with respect WTO law generally,' 7 it can be
expected that, were an effort made to change this provision, its retention
might attract considerable support.
Let us indulge, for a moment, in a hypothetical inspired by the
Gasoline Additives case. France adopts a somewhat different decree relating to asbestos products. This decree permits the importation and sale
of asbestos products that have an established history of controlled use,
monitored by the French Ministry of Health. The French Parliament,
however, under pressure from domestic interests, gives the Ministry a
budget for monitoring only French-source asbestos products. The result
is that imported products are denied any means of meeting the requirements as to controlled use, and are thereby excluded. Should the WTO,
in the name of protecting human life and health, permit this protectionist
measure to pass challenge? No answer to this question is likely to satisfy
all of the interest groups affected by it, and consideration of the question
might well result in a decision to retain the introductory paragraph of
Article XX in its present form.
To return to the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body, by introducing
the notion that toxicity is relevant to competitiveness in the context of
judging "likeness" under Article 111:4, did nothing to clarify questions
involving burden of proof. If anything, they have been confused. The
standard of proof to be deduced from the Appellate Body's report was
not applied in a functional way; that is, it was not elaborated in the actual
hearing of the case, by either the panel or the Appellate Body. Future
panels will have to deal with this confusion, and will have to do so lacking significant guidance as to how their decisions will be viewed on
appeal.
7. The TBT Agreement
As mentioned above, Canada's claim in the Asbestos case that the
French decree violated the TBT Agreement (the WTO agreement on
106. See supra text accompanying note 98.
107. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Break the Link Between Trade and Labour, FIN. TMES
(London), Aug. 29, 2001, at 13; Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Protesting for Whom?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at AI9.
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technical barriers to trade) was rejected by the panel on the ground that
the TBT Agreement did not cover the decree; the panel's views were in
turn rejected by the Appellate Body, but it did not dispose of Canada's
claim, which was left in limbo. Two loose ends remain for commentary
in this connection: should the Appellate Body (1) have rejected the views
of the panel and (2) having done so, have left the Canadian claim unresolved?
The panel reasoned that the operative part of the French decree was
a complete ban on importing and using asbestos, and that a complete ban
is not a technical barrier to trade within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body observed that the complete ban in one section
of the decree was subject to certain exceptions elsewhere in the decree,
which transformed the decree, considered as a whole, into a technical
barrier to trade covered by the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body did
not make it clear, however, why the exceptions served to work this transformation, particularly since, as regards the issues raised in the Asbestos
case, none of the exceptions seems to have been relevant.' 8 One could
defer to the Appellate Body's superior expertise as regards the TBT
Agreement, except for the fact that the Appellate Body seemed reluctant
really to come to grips with that agreement, and shied away from "completing the analysis" of the panel by disposing of the Canadian claim
thereunder.
Such diffidence on the part of the Appellate Body stands in stark
contrast to its willingness to engage in analysis-completion in a great
many areas. Moreover, the task here, but for the fact (mentioned above)
that there seems to be a pervasive lack of eagerness to interpret the TBT
Agreement, would not seem that difficult. The TBT Agreement can be
viewed as a logical continuation of GATT 1994, the former being expressly intended to further the objectives of the latter. Thus, much as the
Appellate Body has elsewhere grounded analysis-completion on the
finding of "a logical continuum," it might have proceeded (once it,
unlike the panel, found the TBT Agreement applicable) to dispose of
Canada's claim. ' 0

108. This aspect of the French decree was examined at length by the panel, which so
concluded. See its discussion, which precedes its conclusion, Asbestos Panel report, supra

note 3, 8.72-.73.
109. The Appellate Body distinguished its "logical continuum" reasoning in Report of
the Appellate Body, Canada--Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R
(July 30, 1997), http://www.wto.org, on the ground that, there, the second sentence of Article
111:2 was "closely related" to the first sentence. Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4,
79. The TBT Agreement as it applies to asbestos products could also be said to be "closely
related" to GATT 1994 Article XX(b). The term "necessary" in the latter involves the same
thought as avoiding "unnecessary obstacles" in § 2.2 of the former; and the wording of the
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The Appellate Body had analyzed Article XX(b) at length and had
affirmed the panel's rejection, under Article XX(b), of Canada's principal claim under GATT 1994. The Appellate Body had thus already laid
the groundwork for rejecting, for substantially the same reason, Canada's claim under the TBT Agreement. As mentioned above, one of the
recitals of the TBT Agreement tracks Article XX(b), including the language on measures necessary to protect human life or health. It therefore
would not seem to have required a very demanding exercise in analysiscompletion for the Appellate Body to have extended its discussion of
Article XX(b) and the principal Canadian claim under GATT 1994, to
have caused that discussion to embrace the Canadian claim under the
TBT Agreement, and on that basis to have dismissed that claim as well.
If the Appellate Body (overcoming a seeming institutional allergy to
construing the TBT Agreement) had taken this step, it could have implicitly provided a further indication that the panel's basic views on the
applicability of Article XX(b) were not altogether lacking in merit. That
is, by indicating that the claim under the TBT Agreement could be properly disposed of under the aegis of Article XX(b) as carried over into the
TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body would have built on the findings of
the panel already endorsed by the Appellate Body with respect to Article
XX(b), and would thereby have signaled that the basic issues of the Asbestos case taken as a whole should have been dealt with under Article
XX(b) as found in GATT 1994 or as effectively incorporated in the TBT
Agreement."' So doing, the Appellate Body would have established a
salutary bridge between its own report and that of the panel and would
have added constructively to WTO jurisprudence serving as a guide to
future panels.

CONCLUSION

The uneasy relationship between panels and the Appellate Body is in
need of attention, and the Appellate Body is well-situated to provide that
attention. The objective should be to improve the quality of WTO dispute settlement. More constructive use should be made of the reasoning
and substantive content of panel reports. Less institutional time (fewer
precious institutional resources) should be devoted to revision engaged
in for purposes that do not advance the resolution of the case at hand or
introductory clause of Article XX and of the sixth recital of the TBT Agreement are substantially identical.
110. See Professor Robert L. Howse, Application for Leave to File a Written Brief in the
Matter of European Communities-Asbestos 3 (Nov. 10, 2000) (commenting on the TBT
Agreement and Article XX(b) of GAT" 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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the development of a useful jurisprudential framework for future cases." '
That is, cases should be viewed in a rigorously disciplined manner as
embodying individual disputes in need of proper resolution and, where
appropriate, as tools for building useful precedent for future cases. When
critics of the WTO process are in the background of a case, their criticism should be viewed as an opportunity to defend the process not by
distorting it but by using it for the production of well-reasoned reports of
the highest quality, solidly grounded in the relevant WTO agreements.
The panel and Appellate Body reports in the Asbestos case can serve
as constructive examples of how a more effective relationship might exist between panels and the Appellate Body. The Asbestos panel first met
with the parties in June 1999, and it met with the parties and with scientific experts at various times thereafter. It issued a preliminary report in
June and a final report in July 2000, which was distributed in September
of that year. The report is 517 single-spaced pages long, to which is attached an addendum of over 200 pages.'1 2 These data constitute at least
some evidence that the work of the panel was serious and substantial. At
a minimum, the panel not only disposed of the issues but also framed
them for the Appellate Body and provided a detailed background against
which to consider the points raised on appeal. In November and December 2000, the parties filed their submissions with the Appellate Body,
which heard oral argument in January 2001 and issued its report (71
double-spaced pages) in March of that year.
At issue was a French decree designed to protect the public from a
known carcinogen, chrysotile asbestos. The panel report reveals the
panel's perception that the Canadian challenge to this decree should be
resolved under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, which expressly covers
measures necessary to protect human life and health. The panel in fact
proceeded to dispose of the case under Article XX(b), and ruled in favor
of the defending party (the EU acting on behalf of France). While the
panel heard a great many arguments and a great deal of expert testimony,
and wrote up the results of these hearings in some detail in its report, its
reasoning was economical and to the point: it asked whether the decree
at issue met the requirements of Article XX(b), it concluded that it did,
and it ruled in favor of the defending party.
This presented the Appellate Body with an opportunity to deal with
the case in an even more economical fashion, inasmuch as the panel had
already evaluated the testimony and laid the groundwork for an appellate
111. In this connection, see Harrowsmith, supra note 8, at 115.
112. Over half of these pages were devoted to the risk posed by asbestos products to
human life or health (see supra note 67), that is, to the central subject-matter being considered
under Article XX(b).
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affirmation in the event that (as it turned out) the Appellate Body agreed
with the panel that the French decree was justified (could be upheld) under Article XX(b). The Appellate Body permitted itself, however, to get
caught up in a dispute over the "likeness" of asbestos products and substitute products under Article 111:4. To some extent, the Article 111:4 issue
had to be disposed of, because the parties had re-raised it on appeal. In
this posture, however, since the Appellate Body agreed with the panel as
to Article XX(b), the re-raising of Article 111:4 should have been viewed
by the Appellate Body for what it was, that is, as nothing more than precautionary maneuvering by the EU (and by Canada in response to the
EU), lest the Appellate Body reverse the panel with respect to Article
XX(b). Once the Appellate Body had decided to affirm the panel with
respect to Article XX(b), it was in a position to avoid entanglement in
the argument over "likeness" and to state that, in view of the disposition
of the case under Article XX(b), there was no need to reach the question
of "likeness" under Article 111:4.
It is unclear to what extent this "unlikeness" dispute under Article
111:4 may have been the result of disagreements within the Appellate
Body or the AB Division itself, and to what extent it may have been influenced by outside groups dissatisfied that, in their view, the panel had
imposed an undue burden of proof on the EU in its defense of the French
decree. As regards the latter possible influence, the Appellate Body in
the Asbestos case established procedures for the submission of briefs to
it by non-governmental organizations. In response, seventeen applications for leave to file written briefs were submitted, none of which was
accepted by the Appellate Body. '3
Of course, in taking on the "likeness" dispute, the Appellate Body
could have been motivated by reasons relating to the larger picture of
WTO jurisprudence. When so motivated, however, the Appellate Body
would be well advised to hold itself to a simple test: is it turning out a
decision which clarifies existing jurisprudence and will serve as a useful
guide to future panels? In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body did not
rise to the standard implicit in that test. Two members of the AB Division suggested an analytical approach that was not clearly supported by
the evidence in the panel report, and which might not be supported by
the evidence were the matter to be retried in light of the Appellate
Body's report. The third member of the AB Division sought to extend
the concept of "likeness" in a manner which, if adopted, could complicate the resolution of future cases.
The analysis suggested by two members of the AB Division is that
carcinogenic properties render products with those properties (here, as113. See Appellate Body Asbestos report, supra note 4, T$ 54-57.
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bestos products) less competitive than products without those properties
(here, substitute products). The evidence in the case did not support this
analysis, and it may be factually unsupportable. In the absence of positive law like the French decree, the marketplace may be quite receptive
to carcinogenic products even when competitive non-carcinogenic products are available. The Appellate Body did little for the stature of WTO
jurisprudence by engaging in dubious analysis in order to reverse the
panel as to "likeness."
The conclusion suggested by the third member of the AB Division
was to the effect that the comparative consequences for human life and
health should be a criterion for judging the "likeness" of products under
Article 111:4. Noble as this thought may be, it is not good law. The concept of "like products" in Article III is not a catch-all for every policy
distinction that might be advanced for the purpose of showing one category of product "unlike" another. Article III: 1 sets out the economic
purpose of Article III by stating that domestic measures "should not be
applied so as to afford protection to domestic production." Ad Article III
(2), taking Article III to its widest scope, refers to "a directly competitive
or substitutable product." The prohibition, then, is not against products
that are carcinogenic or otherwise harmful, but against measures that are
trade-protectionist. When it comes to carcinogens, the relevant prohibition (as indicated by the panel and affirmed by the Appellate Body) is
found in Article XX(b).
There may have been some reluctance on the part of the Appellate
Body to rely solely on Article XX(b) in view of the protests of some
health and environmental groups following the issuance of the panel report, and their professed concerns over the burden of proof borne by the
EU (on behalf of France) in respect of Article XX(b). The burden was
twofold: the EU had to show that the French decree was "necessary" to
protect human life or health; and the EU had to show that it met the conditions found in the introductory clause of Article XX (forbidding
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and disguised barriers to trade).
These requirements are not inherently hostile to measures designed to
protect human life or health. They are hostile, rather, to measures that,
on the pretext of protecting human life or health, further a policy of trade
protectionism. In this respect, Article XX(b) is of a piece with the true
focus of Article III, namely, the prohibition of measures designed for
trade-protectionist purposes.
The balance struck in Article XX(b) may not please everyone,
although, properly understood (as it may not be by some advocates of
non-trade policies), it may in fact please a very large number of
constituencies. Changing or circumventing Article XX(b) is bound to
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displease certain constituencies, such as developing countries suspicious
of measures advocated by industrialized countries to protect health, the
environment, or labor standards. In any event, this debate is not one that
can be resolved in the context of WTO dispute resolution, and it is to be
hoped that the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case was not so illadvised as to think that it was making a contribution to this debate.
Rather, it would have made a helpful contribution had it, in affirming the
panel as to Article XX(b), offered an explanation of the reasons
underlying and policies served by that provision.
The uneasy relationship between panels and the Appellate Body
does not facilitate judicial economy within the WTO and adversely affects the quality of its work in resolving disputes. Panels should be
brought more closely and effectively into the dispute-resolution process.
The Appellate Body should provide leadership to this end by fostering a
judicious use of resources within the WTO dispute-settlement apparatus,
by minimizing unnecessary digressions from the economical disposition
of cases, and by consciously developing a workable framework of decisions of utility to panels and itself in the future.

